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I. INTRODUCTION

Recent policy debates over the reimportation of pharmaceuticals from
Canada and Europe have not quantified the potential long-term effects of
such a policy.' Because Canadian and European drug prices are currently
regulated2 while U.S. prices are not,3 the reimportation of drugs from such
markets effectively imports foreign price controls. As a result, the

* Associate Professor of Finance, University of Connecticut School of Business; Ph.D.
1987, Washington University; B.A. 1980, Trinity College.
** Assistant Professor of Finance, University of Connecticut School of Business; Ph.D.
2003, University of Pennsylvania; Ph.D. 2000, City University of London; B.A. 1992, Duke
University. This Article formed the basis for Vernon's testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee
on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions on May 20, 2004.
1. See, e.g., Tech Central Station, Milton Friedman and the Reimportation Debate (transcript
of Jan. 27, 2004 debate), at http://www.techcentralstation.com/020204D.html (last visited Sept. 3,
2004); American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, Unrestricted Prescription-Drug
Importation from Canada and Elsewhere (Oct. 2003) (transcript of Oct. 2, 2003 debate), at
http://www.aei.org/events/filter.,eventlD.634/summary.asp.
2. Patricia M. Danzon, Making Sense ofDrugPrices,REGULATION, Spring 2000, at 56-57.
3. John A. Vernon, DrugResearch andPrice Controls, REGULATION, Winter 2003, at 22.
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profitability of pharmaceutical research and development (R&D)
investment will fall.4 And because expected profitability is the primary
determinant of firm R&D investment in the pharmaceutical industry,5
R&D spending and new drug discoveries will fall as well.6 But by how
much will R&D spending fall, and how much will this cost future
generations in terms of forgone years of life? This Article addresses and
attempts to answer these questions.
Industry critics claim pharmaceutical companies earn excess profits
that are more than enough to fund their R&D in the face of reimported
drugs.7 These critics expect little, if any, effect on R&D and new drug
discoveries.' Conversely, pharmaceutical executives assert that
pharmaceutical innovation will be decimated by reimportation. 9 However,
consumer groups and industry critics typically focus on the huge profits
earned by successful new drugs and ignore the costs of failed research,' °
while pharmaceutical firms seldom publicize their strategies for coping
with price regulation." Canada and European countries offer a patchwork
of price regulations" and reimportation has been legal there for many
years. This Article uses the European experience as a template to
benchmark the likely effects of legalized reimportation on the United

4. Firms undertake R&D investment because of expected future returns from these efforts.
As profits fall, so will the level of R&D because it is no longer as attractive an investment. See,
e.g., John A. Vernon, Examining the Link Between Price Regulation, Re-importation, andR&D
Investment, 13 HEALTH ECON. (forthcoming 2004), availableat http://www3.interscience.wiley.
com/cgi-bin/fulltext/108561688/PDFSTART (last visited Oct. 26, 2004).
5. Henry G. Grabowski & John M. Vernon, The DeterminantsofPharmaceuticalResearch
and Development Expenditures, 10 J. EVOLUTIONARY ECON. 201, 201-02 (2000); Vernon, supra
note 3, at 22-23; Vernon, supra note 4.
6. Grabowski & Vernon, supra note 5, at 201-15; Vernon, supra note 3; Vernon, supra
note 4.
7. See Public Citizen, Statement on "InternationalDrugParityAct of 1999""(H.R. 1885):
Safe Drug ReimportationLaw Could Save ConsumersBillions, CONGRESS WATCH, June 9, 1999,
(last
at www.citizen.org/congress/reform/archives/106congress/reimport/articies.cfn?ID=1008
visited Sept. 17, 2004).
8.

KATHERINE GREIDER, THE BIG FIX: How THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY RIPS OFF

AMERICAN CONSUMERS (PUBLIC AFFAIRS REPORTS) 43-61 (2003).

9. John K. Iglehart, An Industry UnderSiege Mounts CounterAttack, 23 HEALTH AFF. 7-8
(2004).
10. GREIDER, supranote 8, at 43-61.
11. For insight into the activities of major pharmaceutical firms in Britain, see The
Association of the British Pharmaceutical Industry, Department of Health Discussion Paper: The
Pharmaceutical Price Regulation Scheme (Sept. 2003), at http://www.abpi.org.uk/information/
pdfs/PPRS-ABPI-Response-To-DOH.pdf (last visited Aug. 24, 2004).
12. PATRICIA M. DANzON, PHARMACEUTICAL PRICE REGULATION: NATIONAL POLICIES VS.
GLOBAL INTERESTS 15-29 (1997).
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States. The expected costs are not devastating, but they are substantial and
should be weighed carefully against the benefits.
The legalization of pharmaceutical reimportation from Canada and
Europe could significantly diminish the incentives to invest in the risky
business of pharmaceutical R&D.13 A decline in R&D, or even a decline
in the growth of R&D, will result in fewer future drug discoveries. 4
Indeed, the threat of reimportation may have already affected
pharmaceutical firms' R&D decisions. Because R&D investment is longlived, forward-thinking firms make investment decisions today based upon
expectations of profitability well into the future. 5 The average growth rate
in total R&D for 2002 and 2003 was 5.6% compared to 13.4% over the
last 33 years.' 6 A similar decline in R&D growth occurred in response to
the threat of price regulation during the Clinton Administration even
though the health care reform act 7 never passed.'"
Recent evidence documents the tremendous value generated by medical
research, especially pharmaceutical R&D,19 and this evidence concludes
that the United States may already be under-investing in R&D.20 While the
reimportation of price-regulated pharmaceuticals from abroad could
generate short-term economic benefits for U.S. consumers, 2' the long-term
costs are substantial. Furthermore, the European experience with
reimportation shows that the benefits can be small due to additional

13. For insight into just how expensive and risky is the business of pharmaceutical R&D, see
Joseph A. DiMasi et al., The Priceof Innovation:New Estimates of Drug Development Costs, 22
J. HEALTH ECON. 151 (2003); PHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCH AND MANUFACTURERS OF AMERICA,
PROFILE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 2-4 (2004) [hereinafter PhRMA], at http://www.phrma.org/

publications/publications/2004-03-31.937.pdf (last visited Oct. 26, 2004).
14. Joseph H. Golec & John A. Vernon, PharmaceuticalReimportation: The European
Experience - What the United States Can Expect, MANAGED CARE, June 2004, at 26-29.
15. RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 311-

36 (2003).
16. PhRMA, supra note 13.
17. Joseph Golec, Shantaram Hegde & John Vernon, PharmaceuticalStock PriceReactions
to Price Constraint Threats and Firm-Level R & D Spending, Univ. of Conn., Dep't of Fin.
Working Paper.
18. Frank R. Lichtenberg, PublicPolicyandlnnovationin the U.S. PharmaceuticalIndustry,
in PUBLIC POLICY AND THE ECONOMICS OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP 83, 97-107 (Douglas Holtz-Eakin
& Harvey S. Rosen eds., 2004).
19. FRANK R. LICHTENBERG, SOURCES OF U.S. LONGEVITY INCREASE, 1960-1997, (Nat'l

Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8755, 2002).
20. KEVIN M. MURPHY & ROBERT H. TOPEL, MEASURING THE GAINS FROM MEDICAL

RESEARCH (2003).
21. For example, short-term economic benefits for consumers include saving dollars on
prescription drugs, which could be spent on other items such as food, clothing, or shelter.
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inspection costs, repackaging costs, import costs and sufficient profit for
the importer.22
Part II of this Article describes the economic basis for the conflict
between short-term and long-term consumer interests and how the price
outcome impacts a pharmaceutical firm's investment decision. Conflict
resolution in favor of short-term interests (reimportation) reduces
pharmaceutical prices, particularly for high-margin drugs that are likely to
attract the greatest reimportation.23 Pharmaceutical firms will respond by
devoting fewer resources to new pharmaceutical R&D.24 Part III uses
earlier empirical work to estimate how much they will cut R&D.25 Given
the productivity of R&D, this leads to fewer new pharmaceutical and
biotechnology products.26 Because the cost of the number of new drugs not
researched or developed is relatively intangible, in Part IV these economic
costs are restated in terms of human life years lost. Human life years lost
are the years of life future generations will not enjoy because some drugs
are not developed or are delayed in being produced. While such estimates
are contingent upon a number of assumptions, the human costs of reduced
health status of future generations are put on equal footing with the human
benefits of greater drug affordability to current consumers. 27 Part V
concludes that reimportation has the potential to impart significant
economic costs on society.
II. THE CONFLICT BETWEEN SHORT-TERM AND LONG-TERM
CONSUMER INTERESTS

Firms allocate resources to R&D activities based on their expected
returns and costs. 28 The degree to which a firm can appropriate the
economic value of a new invention or pharmaceutical product plays a
central role in the expected returns to R&D. 29 New pharmaceutical and
22.

PANos KANAVOS ET AL., THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF PHARMACEUTICAL PARALLEL TRADE

(London Sch. Econ. & Pol.
Sci., Special Research 2004).
23. DANZON, supra note 12, at 46-64.
24. Grabowski & Vernon, supra note 5; Vernon, supranote 3; Vernon, supra note 4.
25. Vernon, supra note 4.
26. DiMasi et al., supra note 13.
27. Without translating these costs into life years lost and dollars, it is difficult to appreciate
what nonresearch or developed drug innovations will mean to society. Thus, for the purposes ofthis
Article "equal footing" refers to a more tangible measure of these costs, which can be more readily
appreciated.
28. BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 15, at 311-36.
29. Grabowski & Vernon, supra note 5; Vernon, supranote 3; Vernon, supra note 4.
IN EUROPEAN UNION MEMBER STATES: A STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS,

20051
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biotechnology products are information products much like books or
computer software. The fixed costs of discovery are substantial: firms
spend more than ten years and hundreds of millions of dollars to obtain
information about a new chemical or biological structure. 30 But once
approved for marketing the marginal manufacturing cost of a new pill is
often quite small.3 ' From a short-term perspective, price should be set low
to reflect low marginal manufacturing cost.32 However, this entirely
ignores the fixed costs of discovery.3 3 From a long-term perspective, low
prices eliminate the incentive for creation of the product in the first place.34
The creation of property rights via limited-time patents is an attempt
to balance the short-term and long-term economic forces. 35 A higher price
for a limited time reduces the availability or affordability to current
customers but provides a profit incentive for innovators to provide new
pharmaceuticals. 36 This fundamental tradeoff was made famous by Nobel
laureate Kenneth Arrow:
Information is a commodity with peculiar attributes, particularly
embarrassing for the achievement of optimal allocation. In the first
place, any information obtained, say a new method of production,
should, from the welfare point of view, be available free of charge
(apart from the cost of transmitting information). This insures [sic]
optimal utilization of the information but of course provides no
incentive for investment in research. .

.

. In a free enterprise

economy, inventive activity is supported by using the invention to
create property rights; precisely to the extent that is successful,
there is an underutilization of the information.37
Limited patent protection and the right of a manufacturer to price and
distribute its product as it sees fit are attempts to balance short-term and
long-term forces. Reimportation constrains a manufacturer's freedom to

30. DiMasi et al., supranote 13.
31. The True Cost of Drug Manufacturing, at http://www.prwatch.org/forum/archive/index.
php/t-4282.html (last visited Aug. 24, 2004).
32. This is a basic principle of welfare economics.
33. DiMasi et al., supranote 13.
34. Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation ofResourcesfor Invention, in
THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS 609-25
(Nat'l Bureau Econ. Research ed., 1962).
35. Id.
36. This assertion is derived from basic investment theory. See BREALEY & MYERS, supra
note 15, at 311-36.
37. Arrow, supra note 34, at 616-17.
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price and distribute its product.38 Reimportation also makes patents much
less valuable and reduces the number of new innovations.39
This tradeoff is represented diagrammatically in Exhibit 1. Here, lower
prices (shown to the left of the socially optimal price) reduce costs to
current customers but stifle innovation and increase long-term costs to
future consumers. From a societal perspective, the objective is to minimize
the sum of the two costs. Limited patents provide the balance mechanism
and reimportation upsets the balance in favor of the short-term.
Exhibit 1:
The Tradeoff Between Short-Run and Long-Run Costs
Economic Costs
Total Costs

Short-run Costs

Long-run Costs

Socially
Optimal Price

Price

Unfortunately, in policy debates, the short-term is often given the
heaviest weight.4 ° This is not entirely surprising due to the fact that the
short-term benefits and costs are more tangible and immediately
38. Golec & Vernon, supranote 14.
39. Id.
40. Sally C. Pipes, President and CEO, Pacific Research Institute, Drug Importation - The
Year's Hottest Policy Debate, Speech Presented to Eli Lilly Corporation (Oct. 14, 2003), at
http://www.pacificresearch.org/pub/sab/entrep/speech-sallyreimportation.html (last visited Aug.
24, 2004).
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recognizable than long-term benefits and costs. Moreover, it is difficult to
anticipate which medicines or innovations will be sacrificed in the future
to pay for greater access to today's medicines.
I]. IMPLICATIONS FOR

R&D INVESTMENT

AND CONSUMER HEALTH

There are two mechanisms through which reimportation can impinge
upon a firm's decision to invest in pharmaceutical R&D: 1) an expectedprofitability effect; and 2) a supply-of-funds effect. The expectedprofitability effect is the idea that greater expected profit margin
encourages greater investment.41 The supply-of-funds effect represents that
internally-generated cash flows provide cheaper funds than funds raised
in the capital markets where firms must pay fees to issue new securities.42
Internal funds generated from cash flows are a particularly important
determinant of pharmaceutical R&D investment.43
These two effects play a major role in a firm's decision to allocate
resources to pharmaceutical R&D.' Exhibit 241 is useful in illustrating the
causal links between the legalization ofreimportation and the costs of such
a policy in terms of consumer health and life years lost. It is critical to note
that this sequence assumes the legalization of reimportation is enforced on
a large scale and that firms are not able to circumvent the system through,

41. Henry G. Grabowski, The Determinants of IndustrialResearch and Development: A
Study of the Chemical, Drug, and Petroleum Industries, 76 J. POL. ECON. (1968); Henry G.
Grabowski & John M. Vernon, The Determinants of R&D Expenditures in the Pharmaceutical
Industry, in DRUGS AND HEALTH (Robert Helms ed., 1981) [herinafter Grabowski & Vernon,
Determinants]; Henry G. Grabowski & John M. Vernon, A New Look at the Returns and Risks to
PharmaceuticalR&D, 36 MGMT. SI. 804 (1990) [hereinafter Grabowski & Vernon, New Look];
F.M. Scherer, The Link between Gross Profitability and PharmaceuticalR&D Spending, 20
HEALTHAFF. 216 (2001); Carmelo Giaccotto et al., ExplainingPharmaceuticalR&D
Growth Rates
at the Industry Level: New Perspectives and Insights (AEI-Brookings Joint Ctr. For Reg. Stud.,
Related Publication 03-31), at http://www.aei.brookings.org/admin/authorpdfs/page.php?id=312
(last visited Oct. 26, 2004).
42. For example, firms typically pay issuance costs of between three and ten percent of the
value of the funds raised when they bring equity securities to market but they do not pay issuance
costs for internally-generated equity. For more details on issuance costs and other reasons why
internal funds are a cheaper source of finance see R. Glenn Hubbard, Capital-MarketImperfections
and Investment, 36 J. ECON. LITERATURE 193 (1998).
43. Grabowski, supra note 41; Grabowski & Vernon, Determinants, supra note 41;
Grabowski & Vernon, New Look, supra note 41.
44. Scherer, supra note 41; Giaccotto et al., supra note 41; Frank R. Lichtenberg, Probing
the Link Between Gross ProfitabilityandR&D Spending, 20 HEALTH AFF. 221-22 (200 1).
45. This detail model is from an earlier publication. See Vernon, supra note 4.

UNIVERSITY OFFLORIDA JOURNAL OF LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 16

for example, restricting exports to foreign markets or altering dosages in
drugs. Thus, the assumption is reimportation will result in foreign prices
prevailing in the U.S. market. Estimates in this Article detail the long-term
economic costs associated with the attainment of the reimportation policy
objective.
Exhibit 2
Likely Sequence of Events Following the Legalization
of Reimportation

Sequence A

f

IN

Sequence B

f
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Exhibit 2 illustrates how estimates of reimportation costs require one
to capture the effects of two sequences of events.46 Estimates are provided
for the sequences labeled Sequence A and Sequence B in Exhibit 2, and
then are combined.4 ' This results in an estimate of the long-term costs of
reimportation not provided in earlier studies.
IV. QUANTIFYING THE ECONOMIC COSTS OF
PHARMACEUTICAL REIMPORTATION

This Article relies on recent research that measures the significant
difference in U.S. and non-U.S. pharmaceutical profit margins and links
the expected decrease in profit margin to a drop in R&D to quantify the
magnitude of Sequence A. 48 All things remaining equal, legalized
reimportation would drive U.S. profit margins down to levels found
outside the United States causing R&D investment to decline by between
23-32%. 49 This range is consistent with two other recent studies that
attempted to answer the same question while employing different
methods." We select -25% as a conservative estimate. Besides being at
the lower end of the range, -25% is conservative because reimportation is
expected to be greatest for high-margin price-regulated drugs for which
price spreads between the United States and, for example, Canada, are
greatest. These types of drugs capture the lion's share of R&D spending; 5'
therefore, the effect on R&D could easily be greater.
Taking the approach of the earlier model, the effect is measured as a
one-time 25% decline in R&D. This assumes that R&D spending is
entirely flexible and can be immediately adjusted. This is the simplest

46. The link between regulated prices and lower profit margins and lower profitability is
supported by numerous studies of the elasticity of demand for pharmaceuticals, in which demand
elasticity has consistently been found to be inelastic. See N. Edward Coulson & Bruce C. Stuart,
Insurance Choice and the Demandfor PrescriptionDrugs, 61 S. ECON. J. 1146-57 (1995).
47. LICHTENBERG, supra note 19; FRANK R. LICHTENBERG, THE IMPACT OF NEW DRUG
LAUNCHES ON LONGEVITY: EVIDENCE FROM LONGITUDINAL, DISEASE-LEVEL DATA FROM 52

COUNTRIES, 1982-2001 (Nat'l Bureau ofEcon. Research, Working PaperNo. 9754, 2003); Vernon,

supra note 4.
48. John A. Vernon, The Relationship Between PriceRegulation andPharmaceuticalProfit
Margins, 10 APPLIED ECON. LEI'ERS 467 (2003); Vernon, supra note 4.
49. This is a smaller decline than found in Vernon's Drug Research and Price Controls,
which considered a longer time period and used a different model specification; thus, it may be
reasonable to view this estimate as conservative. Vernon, supra note 3.
50. Giaccotto et al., supranote 41; John Vernon, Simulating the Impact ofPriceRegulation
on PharmaceuticalInnovation, 1 PHARMACEUTICAL DEV. & REG. 55 (2003).
51. DiMasi et al., supra note 13, at 172.
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approach but an equivalent result could be produced by allowing for an
initial effect and then allowing delayed effects to spread over a few
following years. Alternatively, the long-term growth rate in R&D spending
could be reduced (it is held fixed in the calculations below). However
either of these methods would be equivalent to a one-time drop of 25%.52
Using a figure for R&D spending in 2003 of $33.2 billion,53 an
immediate 25% decline would cut it to $24.9 billion. Total R&D by the
pharmaceutical and biotechnology firms listed on the Compustat database
for 2003 is about $60 billion.14 The $33.2 billion figure is conservative
because it includes only Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of
America member companies (33 companies), and excludes smaller, highR&D firms. 5 These smaller firms could be more affected than larger firms
because they rely on external funding to pay for their R&D.56 Such funding
will not be forthcoming if new and innovative products cannot be priced
high enough to earn market-required returns."
The full effect of Sequence A is not just the one-time drop. The smaller
research base from which future innovations can be developed must also
be considered. A measure of the total foregone R&D due to reimportation
should be the sum of the lowered R&D for each year in perpetuity.5 A
proper estimate of this sum requires estimating future differences and
discounted to present value. To do this effectively, add the annual
differences between $33.2 billion growing at 7.5% annually and $24.9
billion growing at 7.5% annually in perpetuity. 9 This calculation employs
the commonly-used model of the discounted present value of a growing
perpetuity.
Future foregone R&D dollars should not be treated the same as current
forgone R&D dollars. Therefore, discount future foregone R&D at an 11%
annual rate so that forgone R&D in the far future adds less to the sum of
foregone R&D. This discount rate is conservative because reliable

52. Vernon, supra note 3; Vernon, supranote 4.
53. PhRMA, supra note 13, at 39.
54. Standard and Poors Compustat Files (June 2004 data pull).
55. PhRMA, supranote 13, at 39.
56. Most small biotech firms do not have positive cash flows (Standard and Poors Compustat
Files).
57. This is because investors require an expected rate of return on their investments. With
reimportation or price controls many biotechnology investments will not generate the expected rate
of return necessary to compensate potential investors for the riskiness of the investments and funds
will not be forthcoming.
58. This result comes from the well-known, constant-growth perpetuity model in finance.
59. Scherer, supra note 41, at 217 (estimating that R&D investment by PhRMA members
grew at an average annual inflation-adjusted rate of 7.5% between 1962 and 1996).
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estimates for the pharmaceutical industry range from 9% to 11 %.60 Given
these figures, the cumulative value of foregone R&D is $237 billion. This
is the estimate of the Sequence A effect. The result does not depend upon
a specific discount rate or a specific growth rate of R&D. The sole
requirement is that the difference between the two rates be equal to 3.5
percentage points. 6' If this difference was only 2.5%, for example, because
of a 10% discount rate, the Sequence A effect increases foregone R&D to
$332 billion.
The more difficult question to answer is what the decline in R&D will
mean for new drug innovation. The answer depends on two factors: the
marginal productivity of R&D and the time horizon considered. Recent
work maps the relationship from "lost" R&D investment into "lost" life
years i.e., Sequence B.62 Specifically, estimates ofpharmaceutical R&D
productivity show that to gain one life year, the cost in R&D expenditures
is between $1,345 and $4,500.63 While these estimates are historical
productivities, it seems reasonable to use these approximations in the
absence of information on future productivities. Although future
productivities could be higher or lower, discounting in the perpetuity
model will reduce the effect that productivities in the far future have on
our final result. Based upon a figure of $3,000 R&D per life year, the $237
billion in forgone R&D investment translates into 79 million life years
lost. Using, for example, a life expectancy of 77.2 years in the United
States for 2001 as reported by the Center for Disease Control,' this cost
translates into slightly more than one million lost lives.
One further step is to translate these "human" costs into a dollar value.
This value can be compared to the dollar value of the short-term benefits.
We present a range of dollar costs in Exhibit 3 based upon estimates of the
dollar value of a human life. Although estimating the value of a human life
is common for actuaries, we assume that settling on any one figure could
be controversial. Consequently, we show results for a range of $50,000 to
-

60. DiMasi et al., supra note 13, at 153; Stewart C. Myers & Lakshmi Shyam-Sunder,
Measuring Pharmaceutical Industry Risk and the Cost ofCapital, in COMPETITIVE STRATEGIES IN
THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 208, 222 (Robert M. Helms ed., 1996).
61. The pharmaceutical industry has managed robust growth for many years. The industry
might not age like some other industries because demand for the product increases with income and
wealth, both of which rise over time. But if growth were to slow because of industry aging, risk
would fall as well. Therefore, discount rate and the growth rate could move one for one,
maintaining the 3.5 percentage point difference.
62. LICHTENBERG, supra note 19; LICHTENBERG, supra note 47.
63. LICHTENBERG, supra note 19; LICHTENBERG, supra note 47.
64. See Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Web Site, at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/
fastats/lifexpec.htm (last visited Oct. 26, 2004).
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$150,000 for one life year. Recent studies have used $160,000 and
$150,000. Thus, $100,000 is conservative. 65 We present results assuming
$50,000 to provide a symmetric lower bound. We also offer estimates
based upon a range of one-time R&D decreases of between 20% and 30%.
As previously noted, 25% is conservative but we offer a range for
comparison.
Exhibit 3
The Range of the Dollar Cost of Reimportation by Life-Year Value
and One-Time R&D Decrease (in Billions)
Assumed Value of One Life Year
One-Time
R&D
Decrease

$50,000

$100,000

$150,000

30%

$4,743

$9,486

$14,229

25%

$3,950

$7,900

$11,850

20%

$3,166

$6,333

$9,500

Settling on a 25% R&D decrease and a value of$ 100,000 per life year,
a conservative estimate of the cost of reimportation is $7.9 trillion.
Clearly, any figure in the table represents substantial costs imposed on
society. These costs should be weighted carefully against the benefits. If
the costs of legalizing importation exceed the benefits, then such a policy
will make society worse off.

V. CONCLUSION

This Article provides estimates of the costs of legalizing reimportation
of pharmaceuticals and focuses on these long-term costs to future
consumers because they are given less attention in policy debates
compared to the short-term benefits enjoyed by current consumers. From

65. MuRPHY & TOPEL, supra note 20; LICHTENBERG, supra note 19.
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often supports
Medicare to Social Security to tax cuts, the political system
66
costs.
long-term
to
regard
less
with
short-term benefits
Measuring the economic benefits gained from legalizing
pharmaceutical importation is beyond the scope of this Article.
Nevertheless, the current evidence from Europe, where reimportation has
been encouraged and grown significantly in the 1990s, shows that
European consumers have not greatly benefited. 6' A comprehensive study
of European reimportation shows that most of the margin between the
high-priced importing countries and low-priced exporting countries is
68
eaten up by the costs and profits of the firms doing the reimporting.
Furthermore, they find unintended cost of shortages in exporting
counties. 69 That is, some consumers in exporting countries are no longer
supplied because the new drug export companies take supplies from their
country to sell abroad at higher prices.7°
The size of the potential benefits in the United States is unknown, but
at a minimum it is clear that the combined costs of exportation by the
original manufacturer and reimportation by another firm is wasteful to
society. This Article provides documentation of large economic costs of
reimportation through its effect on research and development. At a cost of
79 million life years lost or $7.9 trillion in dollar terms, which is
equivalent to almost three quarters of one year's U.S. GNP, the hurdle for
economic support for reimportation is quite high.

66. Edward J. Kane, Dynamic Inconsistency ofCapital Forbearance: Long-Run vs. Short-Run
Effects of Too-Big-To-Fail Policymaking (Aug. 15, 2000) (paper presented at 8th Central Banking
Seminar of the International Monetary Fund), availableat http://www2.bc.edu/-kaneeb/Dynamic.
pdf (last visited Sept. 9, 2004).
67. KANAVOS ET AL., supra note 22.
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